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The Development of Co-operative Employer/Trade Union 
Relationships in Britain** 
 
A feature of the contraction of collective bargaining in Britain has been the recent spread 
of so-called ‘partnership agreements’. Discussion of these has been sharply polarised as to 
whether they are in the long-term interests of trade unions. This research draws upon a 
two-stage case study approach to explore the underlying characteristics and dynamics of a 
variety of co-operative relationships between employers and trade unions. This variety 
ranges from those that are supportive of trade unions to others designed primarily to re-
strict them. It argues that the formalities of partnership agreements provide misleading 
evidence on the underlying relationships. Closer study emphasises the importance of em-
ployer intentions concerning the encouragement or restriction of trade unions and the im-
plied level of trust in the relationship. Procedural formality may accompany high or low 
levels of trust, but it fulfils different functions in each. The balance of interests for both 
employers and trade unions suggests that where collective bargaining continues it is likely 
increasingly to be characterised by co-operative relationships. 
 
Die Entwicklung kooperativer Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und 
Gewerkschaften in Großbritannien  
Mit dem Rückgang der Kollektivverhandlungen in Großbritannien finden neuerlich so genann-
te „Partnerschaftsvereinbarungen“ Verbreitung. Kontrovers ist die Diskussion darüber, ob die-
se im langfristigen Interesse der Gewerkschaften liegen oder nicht. Mit einer zweistufigen Fall-
studien- Untersuchung wurden die grundlegenden Charakteristika und die Dynamik einer Va-
rietät kooperativer Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften erforscht. Sie 
reicht von jenen, die den Gewerkschaftseinfluss unterstützen, zu solchen, die die Gewerkschaf-
ten einzuschränken suchen. Argumentiert wird, dass die formale Seite der Partnerschaftsvere-
inbarungen über die zugrundeliegenden Beziehungen keine unzweideutige Evidenz liefert. Die 
zweite Stufe der Untersuchung zielt daher auf die Relevanz von Intentionen der Arbeitgeber 
bezogen auf Stärkung oder Beschränkung der Gewerkschaften und auf das Niveau ihrer beid-
seitigen Vertrauensverhältnisse. Durch formalisierte Vereinbarungen geregelte Beziehungen 
können begleitet sein von hohem oder niedrigem Vertrauensniveau, wodurch sie jeweils ver-
schiedene Funktionen erfüllen. Die Balance der Interessen von Arbeitgebern und Gewerk-
schaften legt nahe, dass, wo Kollektiverhandlungen weiterbestehen, der kooperative Charakter 
der Beziehungen wahrscheinlich zunehmen wird. 
 
Key words:  Employers, trade unions, partnership agreements, Britain 
___________________________________________________________________ 
* William Brown is Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Cambridge; Dr 
Sarah Oxenbridge was previously in the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge 
University but is now employed by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. 
The research was financed by the Economic and Social Research Council as part of its 
‘Future of Work’ programme. E-Mail: William.Brown@econ.cam.ac.uk. 
** Artikel eingegangen: 28.2.2003  
revidierte Fassung akzeptiert nach doppelt-blindem Begutachtungsverfahren: 30.11.2003. 
144  William Brown, Sarah Oxenbridge: Co-operative Employer/Trade Union Relationships in Britain 
 
Does the future of collective bargaining lie in co-operation? In recent years trade un-
ions have been weakened by tougher markets and by unsympathetic governments in 
most countries where once they were strong. Increasingly unable to rely upon indus-
trial action to squeeze concessions from employers, unions are having to find alterna-
tive ways to support their members. Perhaps the most controversial strategy has been 
that of developing co-operative relationships with employers. To its supporters, such a 
strategy builds on a long tradition of union involvement in management, and enhances 
both union and employment security. To its detractors, the strategy dooms unions to 
lose both their appeal to their members and their coercive influence with employers. 
The surest way of informing this argument is to explore what is happening in 
practice. In this paper we examine current British experience with the development of 
co-operative relationships. Seen in an international perspective, the reversal of for-
tunes of British trade unions since about 1980 had been particularly severe. But in the 
past five years both the Labour government and the Trades Union Congress have 
been active in promoting co-operative ‘workplace partnership’ arrangements as an im-
portant new direction for trade union development. The research reported here uses 
case studies to evaluate the nature of co-operative deals between employers and un-
ions, and to assess the implications for both sides. We start by sketching the recent ra-
dical transformation of British industrial relations, against which background our cases 
have endeavoured to develop co-operative relationships. 
The background of union contraction 
Collective bargaining in Britain has always had a relatively fluid structure. It has been 
internationally distinctive in its variability, from one decade to another, and from one 
sector to another. The main reason for this is Britain’s comparative lack of legal foun-
dations for collective employment relations. Since the mid 19th century, governments 
have generally avoided legislating for fundamental collective rights, such as rights to 
strike and to organise, or the designation of legal bargaining agents. They have pre-
ferred to leave it up to employers and unions to work out their own arrangements, 
and to ensure that their disagreements were kept out of the courts. At some times 
governments have encouraged trade unions and advocated particular bargaining struc-
tures and practices. At others they have discouraged both unions and bargaining. The 
law has been used both to help and to hinder trade union organisation. But the law 
has never required and enforced any particular bargaining structure.  
The clearest example of this fluidity was the way in which a comprehensive struc-
ture of sectoral collective agreements, built up with government encouragement over 
the first half of the 20th century, collapsed under the pressures of, initially, full em-
ployment and, later, tightening competition. It was also reflected in the uneven rise of 
workplace bargaining during the 1960s and 1970s. In some industries, such as engi-
neering, chemicals and the docks, trade union strength at the workplace forced em-
ployers to negotiate over a wide range of issues and working practices. In others, such 
as public utilities and public services, sectoral agreements retained far more authority. 
All the same, by the late 1970s workplace-based collective bargaining had become 
commonplace in many industries, in both public and private sectors. Accompanying it 
was a tendency for bargaining to concentrate on relatively immediate issues – notably 
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wages and job control – rather than longer-term issues of employee welfare. Elected 
worker representatives, commonly called ‘shop stewards’, came to play an important 
role in the management of employment in most highly unionised sectors of the econ-
omy.  
This form of bargaining was shaken to its foundations in the 1980s. The initial 
upheaval came from a combination of a deep economic recession and of government 
hostility to trade unions. Legislation introduced by successive Conservative govern-
ments made both striking and trade union organisation more difficult. Later shocks hit 
trade unions at different times in different industries, and although the legislative 
changes strengthened employers’ resolve, the driving force was one of tightening 
competition in the employers’ markets. In the private sector the main pressures came 
from increased international competition and more demanding shareholders. For the 
highly unionised public sector, the upheaval came through widespread privatisation 
and exposure to hitherto unknown market forces. Trade union density overall fell 
from 54 per cent of employees in 1980, to 38 per cent in 1990, to 30 per cent in 2000. 
In common with many other countries, the strike propensity of trade unions also di-
minished substantially. The average number of working days lost per year through 
strikes per 1000 trade union members fell from 1075 over the 1970s, to 633 over the 
1980s, to 76 over the 1990s. 
It was widely expected at the time that employers would respond to the acute 
pressures to cut back on labour costs by severing all links with their trade unions. But 
this generally did not happen. There were a relatively small number of employers who, 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, withdrew all recognition, and many more took 
care to avoid granting any union recognition when they established new ‘greenfield’ si-
tes of employment. But the most widespread employer reaction was more subtle, and 
probably more effective. They reduced the range of issues on which they were willing 
to negotiate with trade unions, and they became less responsive to union concerns. In 
some cases active union resistance to what was in effect the employer’s withdrawal of 
specific bargaining rights was confronted and defeated. In others it was made clear 
that the employer was willing to move to full derecognition if trade unions did not 
wish to accept a much reduced bargaining role. In this way, across almost the whole 
of unionised employment, apart from a very few protected pockets of the public sec-
tor such as fire fighters and the London Underground, unions found themselves be-
ing, in effect, involuntarily ‘re-recognised’ on the employers’ terms. 
Ample evidence of this very substantial reduction in the depth and scope of trade 
union recognition in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s is provided by the Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) of 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998 (Millward et 
al. 2000). By the end of the 1990s, trade unions in many workplaces that ostensibly 
had ‘full recognition’ found themselves with effective rights to little more than indi-
vidual representation and consultation. Even annual pay negotiations were described 
by almost a half of the relevant trade union representatives as amounting to no more 
than consultations. Union influence over the conduct of work had been even more 
curtailed. Matched case studies suggest that employers in the 1990s were able to 
achieve changes in working practices that were at least as productive in workplaces 
where trade unions had experienced diminished recognition as in those where they 
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had no presence at all (Brown et al. 1998). Comparison of WERS surveys confirms 
this. In contrast with 1990, by 1998 there was no evidence of lower levels of produc-
tivity in unionised than in non-unionised workplaces (Fernie/Metcalf 1995; Addi-
son/Belfield 2001). In brief, by the end of the 1990s, in most workplaces where un-
ions were still recognised, their impact upon management had diminished substan-
tially. Having once been at the centre of many firms’ concerns, trade unions had gen-
erally become marginal. 
Helping trade union recovery 
It was not only employer attitudes that changed. An important part of the background 
to this study is that, in the late 1990s, an abrupt and to some extent complementary 
change occurred in the government attitude to trade unions. In particular there was a 
change in the official attitude to co-operative deals between unions and management. 
After nearly two decades of Conservative governments that were hostile to trade un-
ions, a cautiously pro-union Labour government was returned in 1997 with a massive 
majority. Legislation was introduced in 1999 that eased many Conservative-introduced 
restrictions on the organisation of trade unions, but that did nothing to ease Conser-
vative restrictions on the organisation of strikes. It also introduced a fairly weak, but 
symbolically important, statutory procedure whereby unions could win recognition if 
they could demonstrate sufficient employee support. There is good evidence that this 
had a catalytic effect on employer attitudes in encouraging a ‘climate’ that was more 
sympathetic to trade unions (Oxenbridge et al. 2003).  
Official encouragement of what became known as ‘workplace partnership’ was 
more explicit. In 1999, amid repeated public statements in support of the idea by the 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, his government established (and later enhanced) a Part-
nership Fund to assist the training and other costs of building co-operative arrange-
ments between employers and unions. In doing so the government was in effect pick-
ing up an agenda launched in 1997 by the Trades Union Congress (TUC). This had 
identified six ‘fundamental principles’ of workplace partnership. First, there should be 
a shared commitment to the business goals of the firm. Second, there should be an 
acknowledgement that there might be quite legitimate differences of interest and pri-
orities between unions and management. Third, measures to increase labour flexibility 
should not be at the cost of increased employee insecurity, which should be protected 
by investment in transferable skills. Fourth, partnership arrangements must improve 
opportunities for the personal development of employees. Fifth, it must be based on 
open and well-informed consultation. Finally, effective partnerships should seek to 
‘add value’ by raising the level of employee motivation. Putting its resources where its 
new policy lay, the TUC also established, in 2001, a Partnership Institute, providing 
expert advisers to facilitate partnership deals. The Institute quickly found itself in de-
mand in workplaces where high trade union membership accompanied poor industrial 
relations, and its role has become one of providing trusted guidance for unions which 
are, in effect, renegotiating their terms of engagement with management. 
All this had marked a courageous new departure for the TUC, which historically 
had been reluctant to embrace ‘business objectives’. In return the government offered 
legislative support, with legislation in 2002 to give unions rights to establish ‘learning 
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representatives’ to encourage employee skill development, and with further legislation 
promised to implement the European Union Directive on Information and Consulta-
tion. Further support was provided by the state-funded but otherwise independent 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas), whose nationwide staff of ad-
visers and conciliators were increasingly involved in brokering and guiding not only 
voluntary recognition deals, but also large numbers of partnership discussions. These 
supportive measures undoubtedly contributed to the fact that trade union member-
ship, which had been falling since 1980, was from 1998 starting to stabilise. 
We can now sum up the background to co-operative relationships between em-
ployers and unions in the 21st century. Over the previous 150 years Britain had devel-
oped a fluid system of collective bargaining with little legislative reinforcement and 
strong traditions of workplace union involvement. Since the mid-20th century the cov-
erage of sectoral agreements largely gave way to either enterprise based bargaining or, 
later, with encouragement from an anti-union government, to no bargaining at all. 
Where bargaining continued it was greatly reduced in scope and impact. This was the 
bleak prospect facing British trade unions that was potentially transformed when the 
Labour government arrived in 1997, with its advocacy of co-operative, rather than 
confrontational, collective bargaining backed by a revitalised TUC and Acas. What has 
been the result? 
The partnership debate  
The current debate in Britain on workplace partnership in Britain has tended to polar-
ise. Organisations such as the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Involvement and 
Participation Association (IPA) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
have been at the forefront of promoting the benefits of workplace partnership. Simi-
larly Ackers and Payne (1998) and US ‘mutual gains’ writers (Kochan/Osterman 1994) 
have highlighted the potential for partnership to bring trade unions back into the 
mainstream of industrial relations in Britain and the US.  
In sharp contrast, the bulk of the academic literature tends to offer a more pes-
simistic view of partnership, focusing on its potential to weaken trade union power 
within workplaces and across the union movement. Kelly (2001) is perhaps the 
strongest academic critic of partnership in the UK. He argues that it provides few 
benefits for unions and members in terms of membership, wages and conditions, 
job security, or influence. Most studies of partnership in the UK take the form of 
case studies of partnership organisations, most of which conclude, like Kelly, that 
the drawbacks of partnership working outweigh the observed benefits (e.g. Bacon/ 
Storey 2000). 
It is clear that the development, implementation, and operation of partnership 
agreements is far from easy. Studies have indicated that union officers and lay repre-
sentatives who have negotiated agreements have had to confront internal opposition 
to the agreement from members (IRS 1999b); that partnership may fail to filter down 
to local levels of organisations (Wills 2002); and that this may be a function of resis-
tance towards partnership from middle managers and regional trade union officers 
(Samuel 2001). Union officials may face difficulties coming to terms with their chang-
ing role under an agreement. Wills describes how, under partnership, union represen-
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tatives may have publicly to endorse controversial decisions that they might previously 
have condemned, and in doing so may lose credibility with members. Likewise, Taylor 
and Ramsay (1998) describe how shop stewards may find themselves isolated and pla-
ced in contradictory positions by agreements. 
To set against this, there is also research that highlights potential benefits flowing 
from partnership working. The TUC (2002), for example, cites enhanced productivity 
and profitability, lower turnover and absenteeism, and more secure and fulfilling jobs 
as positive outcomes. Other studies have concluded that through partnership ar-
rangements, unions may facilitate organisational change programmes (Martinez-
Lucio/Stuart 2000) or legitimise changes in terms of the harmonisation of terms and 
conditions and the shift to quality-focused work methods (Bacon/Storey 2000; IRS 
1999b). Additionally, many agreements (particularly those negotiated during the mid 
to late 1990s) include mechanisms for easing the process of shedding labour (IRS 
1999a; Marks et al. 1998). Partnership may also result in unions being able to influence 
management at an early stage in the decision-making process through consultation on 
employment issues (Samuel 2001; Wills 2002). As Heery (2002) notes in his summary 
of the partnership literature, the possible gain for unions and their members is fuller 
knowledge of, and greater opportunity to influence, both business strategy and man-
agement style. In terms of benefits for the union organisation, case studies have indi-
cated that union membership and steward numbers may increase substantially in the 
period following the development of partnership agreements (Haynes/Allen 2001; 
IRS 1999a; IRS 1999c; Samuel 2001). 
Many common industrial and circumstantial features underlie partnership agree-
ments in Britain today. While there are some high profile agreements in the service 
sector, most prominently in the retail and finance sectors (see Haynes/Allen 2001; 
Samuel 2001; Wills 2002), the majority of agreements have been concluded in mature 
industries facing new and more intense forms of competition. Reflecting this, Samuel 
(2001) distinguishes between “defensive” partnerships, which occur against a back-
ground of crisis, and which may have a focus on redundancy management; and “of-
fensive” partnerships which reflect a consensual approach to modernisation, and may 
involve joint efforts to improve competitive performance and skills.  
The research 
Our interest in this paper lies in the factors underlying partnership, and more specifi-
cally, in the management motives and strategies that lead organisations to pursue par-
ticular forms of partnership. The central concern of our research is to step back from 
an exclusive focus on ‘partnership’ and to look more broadly at the character and cir-
cumstances of mutually beneficial relationships between employers and trade unions 
in contemporary Britain. We were aware that these might not be described explicitly as 
‘partnership’ relationships; that some self-described ‘partnerships’ might fall far short 
of the TUC’s specification; and that the level of formality of such arrangements was 
likely to vary considerably. We therefore adopted a two-stage approach. The first stage 
involved identifying 11 cases from a larger series of employer interviews, and the sec-
ond involved more rounded interviews of employers and unions at a structured set of 
9 cases. 
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The first stage drew on interviews during 1999 and 2000 with senior HR and per-
sonnel staff in 11 companies which at the time had formal partnership agreements, in-
formal partnership relationships, or were planning to negotiate formal partnership 
agreements in the near future. These 11 cases emerged from the project’s 60 case 
studies, which had been selected to shed light on changing responses to trade union 
recognition in anticipation of the 1999 Employment Relations Act (as reported in Ox-
enbridge et al. 2003). Our cases thus come from a non-random, but carefully struc-
tured sample. Interviews with 31 full-time officials from 10 trade unions were used to 
supplement these case study data. Interviews with the union officials did not focus on 
the features of specific arrangements, but covered their experience of changing em-
ployment relationships, including partnerships, more generally.  
The 11 case studies spanned a range of industrial sectors. They included two out-
sourcing companies which had negotiated national-level agreements with trade unions 
after winning public sector contracts; a temporary employment agency; the service di-
visions of two retail electrical and office equipment supply firms; a financial services 
company; three printing companies; and two machinery manufacturing firms. Four of 
these cases had informal partnership relationships with trade unions, and another four 
had formal written agreements of varying titles. Four (including one of these) antici-
pated that partnership agreements would be finalised in the near future. 
The second stage of the project, conducted during 2001 and 2002, identified nine 
case study firms, four from the previous set and five new. They were selected to rep-
resent three broad categories of relationship: three were formal partnerships with ex-
plicit agreements; three were informal partnerships where the term was widely used 
but without any formalities; and three were co-operative arrangements that deliber-
ately did not describe themselves as partnerships. Four of the cases came from ser-
vices: retail, insurance, office equipment servicing, and outsourcing. Four were from 
production industries: light engineering, heavy engineering, food processing, and 
printing. The last was in rail transport. In these second stage cases, interviews were 
held not only with the principal managers involved but also with the relevant full-time 
trade union officials, one or more leading workplace union representatives, and at 
least one union member who was not a union activist. It amounted to a total of 47 in-
terviews with 52 individuals, the majority on the union side. The prime concern was to 
obtain different perspectives on the co-operative relationship from within both man-
agement and the union. Another advantage arising from the more prolonged research 
relationship that was necessary for this second stage of the project was longitudinal 
evidence on the development and dynamics of co-operative relationships over time. 
The origins of and incentives for co-operative relationships:  
Findings from the first study 
It quickly became apparent that there was a broad spectrum of co-operative relation-
ships. In part this was because the firms in question had very different experiences of 
unionisation. At one extreme were long-standing, occasionally difficult, relationships 
with high levels of unionisation, which were typical of production industries. At the 
other extreme were new relationships where inexperienced, often anti-union employ-
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ers, felt obliged to come to terms with unionised workforces whom they had acquired 
through new contracts or takeovers. These were characteristic of service industries. 
The common feature of all firms that were building new co-operative relation-
ships was their management’s intention to involve trade unions in implementing far-
reaching, often difficult, organisational changes. But they came to this differently. The 
most common background was one where trade union-employer relationships already 
had deep roots. Although these were typical of the production sector, managers from 
temporary employment and outsourcing companies had also worked with unions to-
wards partnership over a period of many years. As also noted by Heery (2002), the un-
ion officials we interviewed confirmed that partnerships most commonly emerge from 
“mature” employer and trade union relationships. Their move towards co-operative 
relationships was most often a response to a competitive crisis. Typically organisa-
tional survival was threatened, redundancies were necessary, and workforce morale 
had collapsed. This often led to the appointment of new senior human resource man-
agers, or new owners, who were disposed towards partnership.  
By contrast, the service sector companies had mainly entered into agreements as a 
consequence of encountering unions when they entered new markets, in some cases 
as a result of company takeovers, in some as a result of winning work outsourced 
from the public sector. Confronted with the need to assimilate these unionised 
groups, managers decided that building relationships with unions was essential if the 
company wanted to build market share. Typically they then recruited human resource 
managers with appropriate experience for dealing with these “inherited” trade unions.  
Most managers said that a key benefit of cooperative relationships was that of un-
ion assistance in managing organisational change with regard to consultation, redun-
dancy and redeployment, and, to a lesser degree, legitimising change. In service sector 
companies, unions were involved in harmonising disparate terms and conditions 
brought about by mergers, acquisitions, or tendering processes. More generally, they 
facilitated the implementation of flexible working arrangements and changes to shift 
and payment systems, including the introduction of individualised payment schemes. 
However, while employers agreed almost unanimously that their “partners” assisted 
them in implementing change, there was some evidence of unions also restricting or 
“slowing” change. In spite of this, there was a general view that union involvement in 
communication, pay-setting and consultation processes more generally led to greater 
effectiveness and less management effort, as the union acted as a channel for repre-
sentation of employees.  
According to the literature summarised earlier, a potential benefit of partnership 
for trade unions was an ability to extend recruitment and recognition into areas of the 
private sector that were traditionally difficult to organise, such as the outsourcing, 
temporary labour supply, and retail cases in this study. However in these cases, trade 
unions were often not allowed access to the sites or divisions of these companies that 
did not already have recognition coverage. This resulted in a situation where small 
“pockets” of unionisation existed within largely non-union service sector companies, 
with union officials unable to extend membership.  
Industrielle Beziehungen, 11. Jg., Heft 1+2, 2004    151 
 
Despite such limitations, all our trade union full-time official interviewees were in 
favour of employer-union partnership relationships. The main benefits of formal 
partnership agreements, they felt, centred around employers encouraging workers to 
join the union, as well as better pay and conditions for workers. Unsurprisingly, views 
on partnership varied within unions, with internal debates highlighting differences of 
opinion. Indeed, during the period of our study the leader of Britain’s fourth largest 
union, Amicus, was ousted in an election in which the successful contender criticised 
him for his uncritical, and unduly pro-employer, approach to partnership agreements. 
Trade union officials agreed that partnership agreements could and did run into 
difficulties when companies were faced with severe competitive pressures. Guaranteed 
job security was often the first component of many agreements to be renegotiated or 
abandoned in such instances, and unions were often central to the process of manag-
ing redundancies. Officials agreed that the downsizing process was made easier, with 
better outcomes for employees, with union involvement. This was because the parties 
discussed options to try and stave off redundancies, or because employers discussed 
redundancies with union officials well in advance of making public statements, giving 
them the opportunity to work through redeployment or job-sharing processes ahead 
of time.  
The content of partnership relationships and strategies of control 
How substantial were these partnership relationships in terms of traditional collective 
bargaining rights? We analysed the scope of union recognition rights, the extent of un-
ion involvement in consultation and communication structures, and employer strate-
gies for restricting union power in the relationship. In general, union rights were 
greater in those companies that had informal partnership relationships with unions 
than they were in those that had formalised partnership agreements1. The depth and 
breadth of trade union recognition rights were greatest in the printing and manufac-
turing firms where employers and unions had informal relationships. Outsourcing and 
temporary employment sector employers used recognition agreements which varied in 
depth and breadth, and which in most cases involved union negotiation for only a mi-
nority of employees. The remainder of firms, all in the service sector, had developed 
or were intending to develop partnership agreements that accorded fewer union rights 
or reduced union strength. Employers in the latter two groups had adopted several 
common strategies that enabled them to reduce union power.  
This great variety of co-operative relationships between employers and trade un-
ions implies considerable variation in the extent and nature of recognition of trade un-
ions. This, in turn, reflects very different strategies of employer control. Consideration 
of those cases with limited union recognition reveals the extent to which their partner-
ship agreements were, in effect, instruments of control. A range of strategies was in 
use to dilute or contain union power. Two service sector firms, for example, had spe-
cifically negotiated, or were planning to negotiate, partnership agreements expressly to 
restrict union involvement in employment relations matters. Others used strategies to 
                                                          
1  See Oxenbridge/Brown (2002: 267-269) for a detailed analysis of recognition rights and 
consultative structures in the 11 case study organisations. 
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manage unions once an agreement or relationship had been established. These strate-
gies included: first, negotiating agreements which explicitly limited union rights and 
activity in the workplace; second, refusing to deal with “difficult” trade union officials, 
and dealing only with officials perceived to be compliant; third, endeavouring to re-
duce the number of unions with which the company dealt; and fourth, taking steps to 
reduce union control over communication and consultative structures and to increase 
management control of both. Six of our 11 case study employers adopted one or more 
of these strategies. All six had written, formal agreements, or in the case of two firms, 
anticipated that agreements would be negotiated in the near future. They shared a 
number of characteristics. All were large, service-sector employers with employees, es-
tablishments or contracts spread throughout the UK. Managers from most of these 
firms met exclusively or mainly with national union officers. Most had relationships or 
agreements with multiple unions. Let us consider these strategies in turn. 
To start with the first strategy, employers used various methods to restrict union 
involvement. These included designing arrangements that subtly limited or down-
graded the status of the union “partner”, or which explicitly curbed union power. In 
two firms, rather than calling their agreements “partnerships”, managers used other 
labels that denoted less union power in the relationship, such as “strategic relation-
ships” and “memoranda of understanding”. Other companies had negotiated agree-
ments mainly to gain union assistance in organisational reform programmes. In these 
cases, agreements precisely spelled out union rights, reducing unions’ ability to resist 
change and to undertake certain of their previous activities. The most detailed and 
formal of all the agreements in this study was also one of the most restrictive in terms 
of union rights. Unions were not involved in any aspect of pay-setting and the tightly-
worded agreement enabled managers to reduce and monitor time off for trade union 
activities.  
The ability to pick and choose which trade union officials they dealt with was an-
other strategy of management control. Managers in three firms which had encoun-
tered resistance from trade union representatives had developed strategies of refusing 
to deal with union officials or workplace representatives who presented a problem. 
They worked instead with other more compliant officials. Relationships with national 
officials were felt to be more positive than those with stewards and local officials, as 
the latter tended to resist change or occasionally subjected the companies to negative 
media attention. 
Several of our cases either had, or sought, single-union relationships. Managers in 
these firms had no qualms about derecognising unions which were, in most cases, mi-
nority membership unions. One company with two unions ran a campaign whereby 
the union which recruited the most members over a six month period would be gran-
ted recognition. 
The firms studied could be divided into, on the one hand, those where managers 
dominated the communication process and, on the other, those in which unions play-
ed a significant role, but where union communications ran alongside an ever-
increasing number of management communication devices. In most of these latter 
firms, managers sought to replace union-member communication with management-
employee communication. Again, there was a contrast between the service sector and 
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the production sector. In most service sector firms, communication with the work-
force was conducted entirely through and by managers without union involvement. 
Some of the production sector firms had communication systems dominated by shop 
stewards in parallel with management-controlled communication devices. But in oth-
ers managers had taken active steps to reduce union involvement in communications 
in recent years. These were firms in which unions had broad and deep recognition 
rights. In two of the three, managers had decided, while transforming the company 
culture from one of confrontation to partnership in the early 1990s, that communica-
tion with the workforce should be controlled by management, with the explicit inten-
tion that employees’ loyalties should be shifted from the union and towards the com-
pany.  
The divergent functions and procedural forms of partnership 
The contrast portrayed here is sharp. The organisations examined fell into two groups: 
those where partnership is characterised by the nurturing of collective bargaining; and 
those where the containment of collective bargaining is the primary objective. The 
first ‘nurturing’ group of cases comprised small or medium-sized production sector 
employers which had developed informal partnership relationships centred on har-
monious management-union relationships, high levels of unionisation, and active 
workplace representatives. While disputes occasionally occurred, these cooperative re-
lationships represented the continuation of a tradition of employer-union relations, 
combined with threats to company survival.  
The second ‘containing’ group of cases were service sector employers who had 
negotiated, or were planning, formal agreements which provided unions with fewer 
substantive rights. These agreements often emerged as employers realised that union 
involvement was an inevitable consequence of company acquisitions and mergers or 
of tendering for contracts in unionised sectors. In essence, these service sector em-
ployers were shaping their union relationships and agreements around their human re-
sources strategy, rather than positioning partnership as the centre of their employment 
relations strategy. In such cases, unions may have little choice other than to “take what 
they can get” in the context of low levels of union membership and no tradition of 
collective bargaining. Ideally from the union point of view, such agreements should al-
low them to extend their membership throughout these organisations. As discussed 
earlier, however, this was rarely the case.  
These findings indicate that partnership arrangements in Britain today may be 
characterised by a spectrum of relationships that vary in terms of degrees of union in-
volvement in the workplace. At one end we have partnership relationships in produc-
tion sector firms, where union power derived from strong unionisation and active 
workplace representation. At the other is the highly contained trade union activity of 
the service sector firms.  
Formality and cooperation: Findings from the second study 
In the second stage of our study we were able to obtain a better impression of the dy-
namics of these relationships, both by exploring how they changed over time, and by 
inquiring into different perspectives within both management and unions. It had be-
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come evident that the procedural status of co-operative relationships appeared to be 
important. We could broadly categorise our second set of nine cases into three groups. 
First were co-operative relationships where the term ‘partnership’ was not used. Sec-
ond were informal partnership arrangements that were described in partnership terms 
but had no formal agreement pinning them down. Third were formal partnership 
agreements.  
In the first stage of the research it became clear that some of the arrangements 
that were, from the trade union point of view, most procedurally restrictive and con-
trolling were also the most formal. By contrast, some of the most nurturing were also 
the most informal. It thus seemed likely that the degree of formality was indicative of 
a ‘low trust’ relationship, in the terms of Alan Fox’s analysis (Fox 1974).  
According to this, it might be surmised, an employer whose control strategy was 
one of building co-operative union relationships by means of nurturing the union or-
ganisation would see no need to oblige the union formally to acknowledge and codify 
set limits to its ambit of influence. Inherent in the nurturing process would be an in-
tention to build high levels of trust that would necessarily imply acceptable margins of 
uncertainty within the relationship. By contrast, where trust was low, the employer’s 
main intent, in grudgingly acknowledging an unavoidable need to establish a relation-
ship with the union, would be to minimise uncertainty in the relationship. An impor-
tant vehicle for this would be a very public, written agreement with the union defining 
in great detail the boundaries within which the employer required it to operate. Any 
adverse breach of those boundaries would provide a pretext for terminating or review-
ing the union’s recognition status. It was consistent with this that formalised partner-
ship agreements appeared to be more restrictive than loose, unwritten relationships 
built up as a consequence of years of custom and practice. It was likely that the act of 
formulating a written agreement provided employers with the opportunity to restrict 
and cauterise trade unions’ customary rights. 
This simple inverse relationship between levels of formality and degrees of union 
nurturing seemed robust enough until evidence came in from the nine more detailed 
case studies, of which four provided longitudinal evidence. It became apparent that, 
for various reasons, firms with relatively high trust relationships might also want to 
formalise them. In terms of the “new” cases in Phase II of the study, one, an engi-
neering company, moved from a co-operative relationship to one of informal but ex-
plicit partnership. Interestingly, a food processing company moved from a co-
operative relationship right the way to a formal partnership agreement, again without 
sacrificing its carefully built nurturing commitment. A retail store tightened up its 
formal partnership agreement, shifting the balance with regard to the union from nur-
turing to greater containment, in part response to a competitive threat from a non-
union rival, in part because of a long-held desire to clarify the precise boundaries of 
union involvement in the company. We also found evidence of change in the cases 
examined in the first phase of the research. For example, a finance company decided 
to formalise its informal partnership arrangement as a part of the process of assimilat-
ing newly taken-over companies and the merger of two trade unions with recognition 
rights in the merged companies. 
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An explanation for this behaviour appears to lie in the fact that the act of formal-
ising a relationship serves different functions. It is, like all transactional rule-making, a 
means of reducing the uncertainty of a relationship. But this has both external and in-
ternal aspects. The external aspect was exemplified by the food processing company, 
which wanted to formalise the warm co-operative relationship at one site in order to 
set a clear benchmark for the other factories in its group. A formal agreement was not 
a sign of mistrust of the union, but rather an attempt to codify aspects of the relation-
ship in order to propagate them within the company. Another example is provided by 
an engineering company with a strong co-operative relationship facing a crisis in its 
product market. The conciliation service Acas was brought in to broker major reforms 
in working practices. An informal partnership relationship was developed partly to 
provide visible reassurance to foreign owners that a productive co-operative relation-
ship had been established. 
The internal aspect of formalising relationships is perhaps more complex. The re-
tail store’s shift to a more containing formal relationship with its union in response to 
tougher competition reflected a judgement by the management that the unit-cost gains 
to be won from a co-operative relationship with the union were not as evident as ini-
tially expected. The finance company’s shift to greater formality reflected the fact that, 
in expanding through merger, it desired an agreement that would provide greater clar-
ity in terms of management’s relationship with the trade union. However, in negotiat-
ing a formal agreement, management took the opportunity to extend greater consulta-
tive rights to its non-union employees, an act which might be construed as a means of 
implicitly diluting trade union power. For both these organisations their large, expand-
ing, multi-site, nationwide character created particular problems for the maintenance 
of high-trust relationships. 
Another important internal aspect of the procedural status of co-operative rela-
tionships concerns the internal dynamics of trade unions. Right across the spectrum 
of such relationships, trade union representatives – and especially full-time officials – 
felt that a benefit of more formalised agreements was that they provided a safeguard 
for shop stewards to represent members’ views without fear of discrimination by 
management. This is likely to have less force where there is a high trust relationship. 
But such things can change, and it was a real issue at one small engineering company 
where a chief executive who believed in nurturing the union was replaced by one who 
had less confidence in the union’s ability to “add value” to the organisation. Then 
again, a common concern of senior shop stewards was that excessive involvement in 
informal co-operative dealings with management could isolate them from their rank-
and-file. If they were not seen by employees to be visibly “fighting” management it 
was hard to recruit members. A common response to this concern was to treat pay 
negotiation distinctively, as a traditional ‘distributive’, as opposed to ‘integrative’ issue, 
in the terms of Walton and McKersie (1965), in order to separate pay off from other 
issues and to use it as the basis of a restricted, traditional, confrontational argument, a 
largely symbolic process geared to member perceptions. Managers who lacked an un-
derstanding of the union’s internal difficulties generally found this frustrating, and a 
source of strain in their relationship with the union, since the room for manoeuvre 
was generally trivial. 
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In summary, it is incorrect to expect a simple inverse relationship between levels 
of formality and degrees of union nurturing. Whether or not the employer sees fit to 
nurture the union organisation reflects a strategic choice, conscious or otherwise. The 
weight of procedural legitimation attached to the consequent relationship in terms of 
its formality is a quite different issue. It reflects the extent to which parties with influ-
ence on both sides are concerned to reduce perceptions of the uncertainty of their re-
lationship, both within their own camps and beyond. 
Conclusion 
What does this imply for the question with which we started? Does the future of col-
lective bargaining lie in co-operation? First it should be noted that our findings con-
firm many of those in previous studies. Employers in this study sought agreements 
with unions for very much the same reasons and perceived benefits as those reported 
in other research. However, our study differs markedly from others in taking a longi-
tudinal perspective, and in identifying several types of partnership arrangement, ex-
plicit or otherwise, related to management strategy and high and low trust relation-
ships. The findings cast doubt on the dominant characterisation and analysis of part-
nership in terms of formal agreements. Some of these agreements imply such substan-
tial constraints on trade unions that, lacking strong membership support, collective 
bargaining in those firms may be still-born. Analytically more important than the for-
malities are the underlying intentions of the employer with regard to the role of the 
trade union. Rather than focussing on elements present in formal partnership agree-
ments, we therefore argue that greater understanding of the notion of partnership will 
be achieved if the focus is turned instead to whether or not partnership “behaviours” 
are evident in the employer-trade union relationship.  
These partnership behaviours are expressions of high trust, or of intention to 
build high trust, between the parties. Our research uncovered evidence of these part-
nership behaviours across all three types of relationship: co-operative, partnership re-
lationship, and partnership agreement. In doing so, we are able to identify several be-
haviours that appear to be associated with robust, high trust partnership. They include 
a central and legitimised workplace role for senior lay union representatives; trade un-
ion involvement at the earliest stages of management decision-making; explicit or im-
plicit acknowledgement that each party derives benefits from the relationship; open-
ness in dealings between the parties; and commitment to the relationship from man-
agers at all levels of the organisation. 
Most research into partnership agreements is based on cross-sectional case study 
data, which give the impression that these arrangements are essentially static. But data 
collected in both phases of our research indicates that co-operative and partnership 
employer-trade union relationships are better described in terms of their evolving na-
ture. In most cases where relationships are shifting, the direction in change is towards 
informal or formal partnership, from the starting point of a long-standing co-
operative relationship. Employers sought partnership arrangements in order to clarify, 
formalise, or “benchmark” their relationship as it stood at that moment in time. Con-
trary to our initial impression, it appears that the movement towards formality does 
not always imply a simultaneous shift towards containment. It may simply mean ap-
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plying a new set of labels, or adopting a new terminology, to describe what is in es-
sence a co-operative relationship that has stood the test of time and in which partner-
ship behaviours have been preserved over time. One of the messages of our research 
is the need to look beyond the superficial terminology to the relationships that under-
lie it. Just as the term ‘productivity bargaining’ rose and fell in fashion in 1960s Britain, 
so the term ‘partnership’ can be expected to fall from fashion under the weight of in-
discriminate and tendentious use. But such a fall will not stem the tide of co-operative 
collective bargaining. 
Collective bargaining has been evolving in Britain for two hundred years or more 
and there is no reason to expect it to attain a steady state. For its next phase, however, 
its future does appear to lie in co-operation. The robustness of such a future lies not 
in the formalities and details of explicit partnership agreements, but in the intentions 
that lie behind them. Many employers are offering high trust relationships that imply 
renewed and enduring legitimacy for the trade unions party to them. There is a wide-
spread and very positive response to this from the British trade union movement. In-
deed, given that these stances are widespread among employers and among trade un-
ions, it is safe to predict a continued, deliberate, expansion of co-operative relation-
ships between them over the coming years. In any particular enterprise, the challenge 
for the relationship will be whether it will survive future changes in company man-
agement, and in the business and legislative environments. But for unionised employ-
ment in Britain as a whole, the future will lie in greater co-operation. The economic 
and legal environment in prospect leaves little option. 
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